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DETECTING COLLUSION ON HIGHWAY PROCUREMENT 
 
M. FLORENCIA GABRIELLI 
 
RESUMEN 
 
Este trabajo se focaliza en el estudio de comportamientos cooperativos en 
mercados de subastas. Este artículo tiene dos objetivos principales. En primer 
lugar, desarrollar una metodología para detectar la presencia de cárteles usando 
el enfoque estructural. En segundo lugar, aplicar esta metodología a una base 
de datos de licitaciones para la construcción de carreteras en California. A 
través de la comparación de un modelo de competencia y un modelo de 
colusión se encuentra evidencia que sugiere que un subgrupo de firmas podría 
haber estado involucrado en un esquema colusivo. 
Clasificación JEL: C14, C72, D44. 
Palabras Clave: Subastas, Cartel, Enfoque Estructural, Colusión, 
Competencia. 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper proposes a procedure to detect collusion in asymmetric first-price 
procurement. The main objective is twofold. First, to provide a methodology to 
detect collusion using a structural approach, and second to apply the 
methodology to field data on procurement auctions for highway construction 
in California. I identify two different sets of firms as potential ring members. 
Relying on an exogenous number of bidders and the assumption that within 
each type bidders are symmetric, I find evidence supporting the collusive 
scheme, for the two mentioned sets of firms by comparing a model of 
competition and a model of collusion.  
JEL Classification: C14, C72, D44. 
Keywords: Auctions, Cartel, Structural Approach, Collusion, Competition. 
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DETECTING COLLUSION ON HIGHWAY PROCUREMENT 
 
M. FLORENCIA GABRIELLI* 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
Despite the vulnerability to bidder collusion, auctions and procurements are 
widely used mechanisms for allocating goods and services. Most government 
acquisitions are competitively procured (see Kelman, 1990). As Marshall and 
Meurer (2001) point out, construction and highway projects are typically 
procured by the government, assets of bankrupt businesses are usually 
liquidated by means of an auction, the federal government is the biggest 
auctioneer in the U.S. and offshore oil leases as well as timber from national 
forests are sold by means of auctions. There are several reasons why a good 
understanding of cooperative behavior in auctions or procurements is desired. 
The argument made most frequently in the literature is that collusion creates 
inefficiencies. In an auction context, the traditional view is that bidder 
collusion depresses seller revenue. In particular, in markets involving the 
government as a buyer or seller it is argued that collusion leads to increased 
government expenditures at procurements and decreased revenues at auctions. 
An additional problem in the case of the government is that raising 
government’s funds through distortionary taxes creates inefficiencies. Thus, 
the increased revenue spent in procurements because of collusion is not simply 
a wealth transfer.  
Auctions are susceptible to bid rigging where bidders collude to dwarf the 
competition, thereby hurting the taxpayers. Bid rigging is pervasive in various 
markets, such as public construction, school milk supply, stamps; see Comanor 
and Schankerman (1976); Feinstein, Block, and Nold (1985); Lang and 
Rosenthal (1991); Porter and Zona (1993); Bajari (2001); Porter and Zona 
(1999); Pesendorfer (2000); Asker (2008); Harrington (2008) and municipal 
bonds among others. Marshall and Meurer (2001) argue that criminal and civil 
enforcement of the antitrust laws has deterred price–fixing in some market 
settings, but not bidder collusion. In particular they mention that many cases in 
the 1980’s and more recent high–profile cases serve as a reminder that the 
success of anti–collusive policies is limited in auction and procurement 
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markets. Since bid rigging either lowers the revenue collected or increases the 
cost of procurement and if this shortfall were met through some distortionary 
taxes then it creates further inefficiencies. Thus, the increased revenue spent on 
procurements due to collusion is not simply a wealth transfer from taxpayer to 
the colluders. For example, in the case of United States of America v. Carollo, 
Goldberg and Grimm, the accused bidders are charged for rigging bids in 
many municipal bonds auctions cost state and local governments billions of 
dollars; see Taibbi (1986). It is important to detect and stop collusion as soon 
as possible.  
Previous empirical work on collusion either rely on data from civil lawsuits 
to estimate the welfare cost of collusion or use reduced form estimation that 
ignores potential strategic interactions amongst colluders leading to 
misspecification errors.1 It is not an exaggeration to say that such data from 
lawsuits are very hard to come by and even if they do, in most cases, it is 
already too late.  
Identifying the characteristics of competitive behavior is a necessary first 
step towards collusion detection. Using the structural approach to analyze 
auction data, the main objective of this paper is to develop a methodology to 
detect collusive behavior. The idea is to compare two alternative models. Both 
models share the feature that bidders are allowed to be ex ante asymmetric 
(across types). As argued by Bajari (1997) and Bajari and Ye (2003), realistic 
models of bidding for procurement contracts should consider asymmetries 
among bidders. There are many sources that can create asymmetries among 
which the most important ones are location and capacity constraints. Other 
reasons often cited in the literature are different managerial skills, different 
information about the project, and the presence of a bidding ring, to name a 
few.  
In this paper I identify two different sets of firms as potential ring members. 
Relying on an exogenous number of bidders and the assumption that within 
each type bidders are symmetric, I find evidence supporting the collusive 
scheme for the two mentioned sets of firms. This paper seeks to contribute to a 
better understanding of the implications of collusion. However I do not claim 
that this procedure can and should replace wiretapping and thorough criminal 
investigations. If anything, the procedure should be taken only as a first step in 
assessing the likelihood of bid rigging. On a technical ground, the paper also 
                                                          
1 For an exception see Asker (2008). 
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seeks to contribute to the literature on empirical auction pioneered by Guerre, 
Perrigne, and Vuong (2000) by expanding their testable implications of first-
price auction models by including a model of collusion; see also Flambard and 
Perrigne (2006).  
This paper is organized as follows. Section II outlines the theoretical model 
that leads to the econometric model. I first discuss the maintained assumptions 
throughout the paper. Then I present the theoretical framework that 
encompasses both, the competitive model and the collusive model. In this 
section I also provide some arguments for distinguishing the two competing 
models. Section III contains the econometric methodology followed in this 
paper. A description of the data and the market for construction projects in 
California is given in section VI. Section V shows how I classify different 
firms into different types of firms. In section VI I present the main results of 
this study and section VII concludes. Finally, an appendix collects some 
practical issues; in particular the choices of kernels and bandwidths used to 
estimate the models are discussed.  
 
II.  Structural analysis 
 
In this section I describe the environment for a procurement model with 
private information in which firms compete for a construction project. 
Specifically I consider a first–price sealed–bid auction within the Independent 
Private Value (IPV) paradigm with asymmetric bidders and an exogenous 
number of bidders. First I discuss the assumptions maintained throughout the 
paper in the following section. Then, I introduce the case in which firms bid 
competitively and after that I adapt the model to allow for collusion.  
 
II.1.  Assumptions 
 
A single and indivisible project is procured to      risk neutral potential 
bidders. I assume that bidders of type         draw their private costs 
independently from a distribution      . I further assume that cost distributions 
depend on the number of bidders only via   which is a vector of exogenous 
characteristics. In other words the distributions of private costs do not depend 
directly on the number of bidders. I will call this the exogeneity assumption.  
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Therefore, the number of bidders is exogenous. That is, firms do not make 
entry decisions on the basis of perceived profitability. Thus, the number of 
potential bidders,   , and the number of actual bidders,  , is the same. This 
implies that the reserve price is nonbinding. An announced binding reserve 
price,   , or an entry fee,  , are screening devices for participating in the 
auction. As pointed out by Perrigne and Vuong (1999) this complicates the 
nonparametric identification and estimation of the model. 
There are few theoretical models in the literature which address 
endogenous entry decisions by means of a two–stage game (see e.g. Levin and 
Smith, 1994). However, in this kind of models the participation decision and 
the bidding decision of each firm are independent. This implies that in the 
second stage the bidding behavior is basically the same as the one described in 
this paper. To the best of my knowledge, there is no model in the literature 
considering a two–stage game in which both decisions are correlated. Thus, 
this is outside the scope of this paper.
2
  
Let   ,    and    denote the number of participants for type 0, 1, and 2, 
respectively, which are observed by all firms. In other words, firm   knows its 
actual competitors.  
The distribution of private costs is given by            
       
       
     . 
These three distributions are common knowledge with common support      . 
Let       denote the corresponding densities which are assumed to be 
continuously differentiable and bounded away from zero on their support.  
 
II.2.  Model for competitive bidding (Model A) 
 
In the competitive framework, group 1 characterizes large firms that bid 
simultaneously (on a pairwise basis) more than a handful of times. Group 2 
contains the remaining large firms and group 0 the other (small) bidders.
3
  
Each firm   of type   submits a bid,    , which depends on its own project 
cost    . Firm   maximizes its expected profit.  
The expected profit of type         bidders is: 
                                                          
2 Recently some papers have taken endogenous participation into account, e.g. Haile, Hong, and 
Shum (2003); Marmer, Shneyerov, and Xu (2011); Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2011). 
3 Large firms are those with a revenue share of at least 1% in the empirical application. See 
section VI for further details. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
132                                                               ECONÓMICA 
 
 
 
      (       )  (       
   
   )   (       
      
    )                        
               (                        ) 
            
         (       )(    [  
  (   )])
    (    [  
  (   )])
    
              (               
        )
      
 
 
where       denotes type  
   equilibrium strategy.  
Lebrun (1996, 1999) and Maskin and Riley (2000a, b, 2003) among others, 
have studied the existence and uniqueness of the Bayesian–Nash equilibrium 
in asymmetric first–price, sealed–bid auctions.4 It is known from this literature 
that the equilibrium strategies      ,       and       satisfy the following 
system of differential equations: 
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subject to the boundary conditions                   , and       
             .
5
 The above system of equations does not have a closed 
form solution, introducing a major difficulty for estimating the model. In this 
way, the application of direct estimation procedures to field data becomes 
cumbersome and only some numerical methods could be use but they require 
the numerical determination of the equilibrium strategies for any trial 
parameter value (see Perrigne and Vuong (1999, 2008) for further details).  
To complete the specification of the econometric model that follows from 
the theoretical model, let       be the distribution of bids corresponding to 
                                                          
4 The assumptions about     and    described above guarantee that the type–specific equilibrium 
of this game exists and is unique. 
5 In a slightly abuse of notation I use           to indicate the derivative of the strategy with 
respect to the private cost, i.e. the first argument. 
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bidders of type        , and let       denote the corresponding density. 
Following a similar argument to achieve identification as the one in Guerre, 
Perrigne, and Vuong (2000), system (1) above can be expressed as follows: 
 
       
 
(    )
  (  )
    (  )
   
  (  )
    (  )
       
      (  )
        (  )
                             (2) 
 
This set of conditions establishes that unobserved private costs are 
identified from observed bids and bidders’ identities.  
 
II.3.  Model for efficient collusion (Model B) 
 
The environment in which the collusive game takes place is similar to the 
one for the competitive model. That is, I assume that firms are engaged in a 
first–price sealed–bid auction where they compete for construction projects. 
The difference with the previous model arises in the way type 1 firms decide 
their bidding strategies.  
In order to adapt the model developed above, I assume that the cartel 
behaves efficiently. This assumption can be justified if one thinks that there are 
side payments among ring members, a practice that has been used in cases in 
which collusion has been detected.
6
 I assume that side payments are cleared 
among all cartel firms before the target auction takes place. The cartel operates 
as follows; all ring members submit bids according to the strategy given by the 
first order conditions (see below). Moreover, the designated winner is the firm 
with the lowest cost. Hence, cartel members communicate before an auction is 
conducted to compare their cost estimates. Therefore the model in section II.2 
can be adapted to this case. Thus, this model is a special case of the 
asymmetric IPV framework described above.  
Under efficient collusion, both competitive firms and cartel firms 
participate in an auction. As before, there are 3 types of bidders. I label cartel 
firms as type 1 bidders. Large competitive firms are named as type 2 firms and 
                                                          
6 This is the most favorable condition for collusion and the failure to detect collusion in this 
scenario means that it is unlikely to detect collusion when there is no centralized ring-
mechanism. Thus, I do not need to know the side payments that are necessary to sustain 
collusion; see Marshall and Marx (2007) for more on this. 
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small competitive (fringe firms) will be type 0 bidders. From the perspective 
of a type 1 bidder, there is only one such firm participating (seriously) in an 
auction. Hence,      for this group of firms.
7
 As before, there are    and    
bidders of type 0 and type 2, respectively. I maintain the assumption that 
bidders of type   draw their private costs independently from a distribution 
     ,        .  
I present now the maximization problem for each type of bidder and derive 
the first order conditions that private costs satisfy under a Bayes–Nash 
equilibrium. The expected profits for type       bidders in this model are 
exactly as in the competitive case.  
For type 1 bidders the expected profits under collusion are:  
 
                (       
      
   )  (       
      
   ) 
                         
         
          
         
   
 
Side payments are not included in the expected profits for type 1 bidders 
given that they are paid before the target auction whether or not the bidder 
wins (see above).  
The first order conditions derived for type 0 and type 2 bidders are exactly 
the same as in the competitive model. For type 1 bidders, i.e. cartel members, 
only the minimum bid,   
  can be rationalize by the FOC. After using a similar 
argument for identification as the one in Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000), 
type 1 costs can be expressed as follows: 
 
      
  
 
  
     
  
       
  
   
     
  
       
  
              (3) 
 
Notice that under efficient collusion, expected profits,    , are different 
only for type 1 bidders. Hence, the expression for private costs is also different 
for this type of bidders as compared to the competitive case. As mentioned 
above only the minimum bid is used for this type of players.  
 
                                                          
7 What the efficient cartel actually does is to limit the level of competition among its members. 
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II.4.  Comparing the two alternative models 
 
As shown in sections II.2 and II.3, for each competing model there is an 
expression for private costs for each type of bidder (see equations (2) and (3)). 
Moreover, the difference between models boils down to the difference between 
type 1 costs in each case.  
The idea now is to test whether the data are best explained by an 
Asymmetric IPV model in which there is no collusion (Model A), or by an 
Asymmetric IPV model in which type 1 bidders collude efficiently (Model B). 
To control for possible heterogeneity across auctions I consider the variable 
     
 ,        , which denotes relevant characteristics of the     
project.
8
 Therefore all the distributions are conditional distributions namely 
         and         . In particular, bid distributions depend on the number of 
bidders. I further assume that the vectors                 , are independent 
and identically distributed across  .9  
In order to be able to distinguish which of the two models described above 
best explains the behavior of bidders during the sample period considered, I 
rely on the following observation. The underlying distributions of private costs 
in the “right” model should not change with the number of bidders. This is a 
direct consequence of our exogeneity assumption. In other words, if it were the 
case that bidders are just asymmetric and therefore Model A is the appropriate 
one to use, then the underlying distributions of private costs for each type of 
bidder should be the same regardless of how many bidders participate in an 
auction when the competitive model is estimated. At the same time, under this 
scenario I expect to see more variation in cost distributions for the collusive 
model across  . On the other hand, if type 1 bidders indeed act as an efficient 
cartel so that Model B is the relevant one to use, it must also be the case that 
the distributions of private costs do not change with the number of bidders and 
again some variation is expected for the competitive framework in this case.  
The logic of the method is very simple and straightforward and relies 
heavily on the exogenous entry assumption as mentioned above. Suppose the 
true data generating process (DGP) is competition (Model A), then the 
conditional density of the recovered cost of bidders will be independent of the 
                                                          
8 In the empirical application     and    is the Engineers’ Estimate for the     auction. 
9 Notice that this assumptions allows the number of bidders to depend upon the characteristics of 
the project since it does not require independence between    and the number of bidders. 
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number of opponents, in other words, the recovered density should remain the 
same even when the number of actual bidders in each category changes. 
However, the estimated density under the misspecified model of collusion will 
be very sensitive to the number of bidders in each auction. This property is a 
direct consequence of exogenous entry assumption and is also symmetric 
because if the true DGP was collusion (Model B) then it would lower the 
competition faced by bidders from other type 1 bidders but the recovered cost 
distribution is still independent of the number of other bidders. But, under 
competition I expect the density to vary with the number of bidders.  
I show that using this intuitive method a collusive model does rationalize 
the observed bids suggesting that the bidders (in the empirical application) 
might be colluding. The result of this method will be explained using the 
recovered conditional densities under various scenarios and the conclusion 
about the true DGP will be reached by way of “eyeballing” the figures 
(collected in the Appendix). Although the conclusion of this method is 
sensitive to the way bidders’ type are determined, because it affects the 
effective competition by affecting size of the collusive ring, the method can be 
used with all forms of auction data.  
It is important to emphasize that failure to see unchanged cost distributions 
as the number of bidders varies could also be due to asymmetries within types. 
The model allows for asymmetric bidders across types, but symmetry is 
assumed for bidders of the same type. It is also possible that not all ring 
members are included in the group defining type 1 bidders. Moreover, other 
(non-identified) cartels could be operating during the sample period as well. If 
this were the case, then these firms would be (wrongly) labeled as type 0 or 
type 2 bidders thus yielding misleading results.  
The method is based on structural estimation and does not require any prior 
knowledge about collusion but exploits the difference between the inverse 
bidding behavior with and without collusion, this is an advantage of this 
methodology with respect to reduced form analysis. Finally, the comparison of 
the models boils down to distinguishing between the cost distributions for type 
1 bidders in each competing model. 
 
III.  The econometric approach 
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In this section I outline the econometric strategy implemented to obtain the 
distribution of private costs for each subgroup. In the same spirit as Guerre, 
Perrigne, and Vuong (2000) I use a two step nonparametric procedure. In the 
first step I apply kernel methods to estimate the distribution and density of 
observed bids for each group of bidders. The second step then uses these 
estimated functions to recover pseudo private costs which are used to obtain 
the corresponding estimated densities.
10
  
I first discuss some practical issues. The skewness of the bid distribution is 
a typical problem encountered with auction data. In addition, the use of kernel 
estimators is subject to the so–called boundary effect so that some kind of 
trimming is often used.
11
 As a consequence it is common practice among 
empirical researchers to use a logarithmic transformation in order to keep a 
substantial number of observations after trimming (see for example [?]). For 
notational simplicity I suppress the dependence of the distributions on      . 
Later, when presenting the estimators I include these variables explicitly. 
Applying the log transformation to system (2) yields: 
 
     (    )      
   
  
  
      
       
         
   
       
         
       
           
             
  
 
for j=0,2 and: 
 
               
   
    
  
       
         
       
       
         
   
       
         
        (4) 
 
For system (3) the transformed system of equations differs from system (4) 
above only in the expression for      , namely: 
 
             
   
    
  
       
         
   
       
         
                (5) 
                                                          
10 Unobserved heterogeneity can be addressed following the procedure in Krasnokutskaya and 
Seim (2011). For an explanation about how to implement this see Aryal and Gabrielli (2013). 
11 To avoid trimming I could have used Local Polynomial Estimators (LPEs) instead of kernels 
in the first step. However, here it does not matter because I am mainly interested in assessing the 
center of the distributions of private costs. 
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where            ,        is the cdf of          and        is its 
corresponding density, for        . I abuse the notation and use     to mean 
the lowest bid amongst type 1 bidders because under collusion the remaining 
bids are just cover bids and hence arbitrary. Henceforth, in estimating Model 
B, I shall always only use the lowest bid.  
As noted earlier, some kind of trimming is often needed due to the bad 
behavior of kernel estimators close to the boundaries of the support of bids. In 
line with Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000) I adopt the following:  
 
 ̂    {
                                                      
            
 
 
for        ,          and        , where      and      are the 
minimum and maximum of log bids respectively,   ,    are bandwidths and   
is the length of the support of the kernel.
12
  
Let                       . Then, the hazard rate functions 
involved in the expressions for private costs given by the system of equations 
(4) and (5) can be written as follows: 
 
          
            
 
          
          
 
          
          
 
 
for        . Let    denote the total number of observations for bidders of 
type  . I consider   auctions in which different types of bidders participate. 
Thus bidder  ,          of type   participates in auction        . 
Relabeling bidders such that        , i.e. the  th bidder in auction  , the 
sample consists of observation           .
13,14
 Thus, the estimators involved 
in the first step are:  
                                                          
12 Without loss of generality I set       . 
13 To keep the notation simple, I just include    in the formulas above. However, for the 
computation of the estimator I have used     ,     and     separately. 
14 Recall that X characterizes auction heterogeneity, thus it only varies across auctions. In terms 
of the notation used this means that      . In other words, for each auction   the value   is 
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With the sample of pseudo private costs  ̂ I estimate the cost densities in a 
second step as follows: 
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The functions                  and        are kernels. The bandwidths 
for the continuous variables are denoted          and   . The bandwidths for 
the discrete variables are             and      The appendix discusses the 
choices of kernels and bandwidths.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
the same for all bidders participating in that auction. A similar argument applies to the number 
of bidders,   . 
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IV.  Data description and awarding process 
 
The California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) allocates 
construction projects using a First Price Sealed–Bid mechanism. The awarding 
process used by Caltrans is subject to Federal Acquisition Regulations and is 
therefore similar to other states’ procedures. This process is conducted in three 
steps: First, the Caltrans Headquarters Office Engineer announces a project 
that is going to be let and invites firms to submit bids. This corresponds to the 
Advertising Period, which lasts between 4 and 10 weeks depending on the size 
and complexity of the job. Second, potential bidders may submit sealed bids 
based on bid proposals that explain the project’s characteristics. Third, on the 
letting day, the bids received are opened and ranked. The project is awarded to 
the lowest bidder, provided that the firm fulfills certain responsibility criteria. 
After each letting, the information about all bids and their ranking is made 
public. The winning firm is awarded the job no more than 30 days after the 
letting date.  
This section discusses the observable variables and provides descriptive 
statistics of the data. The sample consists of a subset of the Caltrans database 
on procurements of highway and road construction projects between January 
2002 and January 2008.15 During the sample period, Caltrans awarded 2,152 
contracts for a total of $7,645 million. The information available on every 
project awarded consists of the Bid Opening Date, Contract Number, 
Location, Number of Bidders, Number of Working Days, Engineers’ Estimate, 
Amount of the Bid and the Rank of the Bid for each of the bidding firms. Also 
there is information on the identity of each bidder and the address of the firm.
16
 
In line with the theoretical model I only consider auctions in which at least 
2 bidders participate and the winning bidder is the one with the lowest bid. 
There are 1,907 such projects, with a total of $6,989 million. A total of 823 
firms submit bids on at least one of these 1,907 projects. The subset containing 
                                                          
15 I obtain the data from Caltrans web site: http://www.dot.ca.gov/hq/esc/oe/awards/bidsum/ 
16 Some of these tasks include: laying asphalt; installing new sidewalks; striping the highway; 
constructing, replacing and widening brides; planting, widening, resurfacing and installing 
irrigation and waste water system in highways; reconstructing interchanges and widen over-
crossing; rehabilitating roadways and pavements; repairing and/or remove existing bridge and; 
storm damage repair, etcetera. The exhaustive list of the projects is available from the Caltrans 
webpage. 
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big projects, which I define as those for which the engineers’ estimate is at 
least $1 million, has 438 bidders in 780 contracts awarded for a total of $6,502 
million, 85% of the total. Given that the main purpose of this paper is to 
develop a methodology to detect potential collusive behavior, I restrict my 
attention further to big projects with engineers’ estimates ranging between $1 
and $20 million. In this subset there are 724 projects and 413 bidders 
participating with 202 winning at least once. The total value of the winning 
bids is $2,408 million, which represents 31% of the total. I make a first 
classification of bidders on the basis of their revenue share in the sample. 
Thus, there are 25 firms with at least 1% revenue share. I call these firms Main 
Firms. In the theoretical model there are three types of firms. Thus, it is 
reasonable to think that potential cartel candidates are among the main firms. 
Although the exact nature of collusion and how it is sustained is not known, I 
think having subcontractors facilitates collusion as main bidders compete for 
the same subcontractors. This effect is more pronounced for the bidders who 
participate in several auctions and have some non–trivial market share, hence 
the 1% cutoff. Table 1 summarizes the bidding activity of these 25 (type 1 and 
type 2) bidders. All of the remaining bidders will be treated as type 0 
fringe/small bidders.
17
  
The first column in Table 1 gives the number of bids of each main firm. 
These bids represent 34% of all bids in the sample. The second and third 
columns show the number of times each main firm has won a contract and the 
“expected number” of wins, respectively. For example, firm A bids on a total 
of 50 projects against a varying number of firms,    for         , then 
expected number of wins is defined to be ∑     
  
   . By comparing these two 
columns it can be seen that with the exception of five firms, main firms tend to 
win more contracts than expected. In other words, this is suggesting that some 
firms win too often. The fourth column reports the average bid of each main 
firm in the sample and the fifth column the revenue share computed as the total 
value of the firm’s winning bid as a fraction of the total value of winning bids 
for all contracts. The last column in Table 1 contains the participation rate (i.e. 
                                                          
17 Hence, I only look at those bidders who are supposed to be colluding according to Bajari and 
Ye (2003)  but one can use any other method to choose the bidders and the method developed in 
this paper would still work. As mentioned earlier, it is very difficult to sustain collusion in first-
price auction so assuming that the bidding ring can implement any bidding strategy in the 
auction is enough for the purpose of this paper; see Marshall and Marx (2007). 
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the bid frequency rate). There is variation in this rate across firms with a 
remarkable 44% for firm D.  
Table 2 provides summary statistics for a subset of variables in the sample. 
The mean number of bidders per project is above four with most of the 
contracts receiving between two and five bids. On average the winning bid is 
$3.33 million. This number is smaller than the average engineers’ estimate 
which is $3.77 million. The difference between the winning bid and the second 
lowest bid, “Money on the table”, reveals the existence of imperfect 
information among bidders. In the sample this difference is on average 
$300,000. The engineers’ estimate is highly positively correlated with bids (the 
correlation coefficient is 0.95). Despite this high correlation, it seems that the 
engineers’ estimate is not binding as a screening device since in 30% of the 
cases the winning bid is above the engineers’ estimate.  
With the information in the database it is possible to construct measures of 
distance and backlog for each firm in each project. Distance is expressed in 
miles and refers to the distance between the location of each firm and that of 
the county where the project takes place. One would expect that closer firms 
have a cost advantage which should be reflected in bidding strategies. Even 
though there is a positive correlation between distance and bids in the sample, 
the magnitude of this correlation is small (0.012) suggesting that the location 
of the project does not influence bidding decisions much. The way the variable 
distance was constructed takes into account the longitudinal and latitudinal 
coordinates of the county where the project takes place and the coordinates 
corresponding to the zip code the firms have reported as their location. This 
variable is subject to measurement problems which could result in a low 
distance–bid correlation coefficient.  
The variable backlog is defined as the sum of the dollar values of Caltrans 
contracts won but not yet completed by a particular firm. Firms are assumed to 
work at a constant pace during the working–days period of each project. To 
account for differences across firms, I have constructed a measure of capacity 
defined as the maximum backlog carried by a firm during the sample period. 
On average, firms’ capacity is about 60% of the average bid, however there is 
considerable variation in this variable. The last variable constructed from the 
information in the sample is the utilization rate which is meant to measure a 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
                          
 DETECTING COLLUSION ON HIGHWAY PROCUREMENT                         143 
firm’s backlog at a given point in time; it is defined as the ratio of backlog to 
capacity.
18
  
It is reasonable to expect that bidding rings would prefer to operate in 
markets with limited competition. Figure 1 below displays the distribution of 
the number of bidders per contract. The chart shows that most of the contracts 
have between two and five bidders with a peak at four. The fact that we see 
many few bidders is in line with the idea that competition is low in big 
projects. In general higher valued projects (between $1 million and $20 million 
as is the case in this application) attract relatively fewer bidders, suggesting 
that it is the main bidders who can gain the most by colluding and moreover, 
larger projects are more profitable, ceteris paribus.  
 
V.  Classifying bidders 
 
Recall that according to the theoretical model there are three types of 
bidders. Here I explain how I classify participating firms as type 0, type 1 or 
type 2 bidders. The key point is to determine which firms are considered type 
1 firms, since then the remaining main firms will be considered type 2 bidders 
and all other (small) firms will be treated as type 0 bidders. The natural 
candidates for type 1 bidders are the 25 main firms. I start by looking at the 
number of simultaneous bids among these main firms on a pairwise basis, I 
select those pairs with at least fifteen simultaneous bids as potential type 1 
bidders. The result is fifteen pairs of firms involving fifteen main firms. Table 
3 below shows the pairs selected. In the first column the total number of 
simultaneous bids submitted by each pair is reported. The second column gives 
the “expected” number of wins in those projects computed according to the 
level of competition in each one. These two columns together reveal that main 
firms participate (simultaneously with another candidate) more than expected. 
The next two columns contain the actual number of times the first member of 
the pair (third column) as well as the second (fourth column) wins a contract, 
respectively. Comparing the numbers in each of these columns to their 
expected counterparts in column two suggests that at least one member of the 
pair wins often which is in line with previous findings (see Table 1).  
                                                          
18                        (if Cap=0, then Util=0 for all t) 
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A couple of interesting features arising from the comparison between Table 
1 and Table 3 are worth mentioning. First, firm A bids almost exclusively 
against firm D. Second, firm E bids remarkably frequently with both firm A 
and firm D. This triplet of firms could be in principle one candidate. Also from 
Table 3 it can be seen that firms D and P (along with (A,D)) have the largest 
number of simultaneous bids. Due to availability of data for each pair, I 
concentrate especially on those with a large number of simultaneous bids; the 
pair (D,P) constitutes a candidate in this respect. To further investigate the 
behavior of these pairs of firms I follow Bajari and Ye (2003). These authors 
develop two conditions that must hold in equilibrium when bidding is 
competitive. The first condition states that conditional on observables, bids are 
independently distributed. The second condition refers to exchangeability of 
the bid distribution. As Bajari and Ye (2003) point out, these conditions may 
fail when bidding is collusive. In order to assess which pair of firms may be 
labeled as type 1 bidders I test for conditional independence and 
exchangeability.
19,20
  
To test for independence I use a regression–based approach and consider 
the fifteen pairs of firms bidding frequently described above.
21
 The model used 
is the following: 
 
     
   
                                                                (6)  
 
     
   
                                                           (7)  
 
                                                          
19 This set of conditions is necessary for competitive bidding. However rejection does not imply 
that bidding is collusive. 
20 Asymmetry amongst bidders can be attributed to their locations, carrying capacity, 
informational differences and hence any realistic model of procurement auction should allow 
asymmetry, (Bajari, 2001; Bajari and Ye, 2003). Typically, only construction companies who 
participate mostly on highly valued project are called the regular bidders. It is important to note 
that using this test to narrow the set of potential colluders is just one possible way. For instance, 
Conley and Decarolis (2011) exploit some special features in Italian procurement data to 
identify the bidding rings. 
21 The main reason for conducting pairwise tests is basically driven by the amount of data. There 
are relatively few observations for the triplet (A,D,E) in the sample. 
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where the regressors have been already discussed above.         refers to the 
logarithm of distance and          refers to the logarithm of the minimum of 
distances of all firms on project  , excluding  . 
Thus, if firm   is among the fifteen firms in Table 3, i.e. a main firm that 
frequently bids against another main firm, I use equation (6) with firm–varying 
coefficients. If firm   is not one of the largest fifteen firms I use equation (7). 
For the estimation both equations are pooled and I include project fixed 
effects.  
Let     be the correlation between the residual to firm  ’s bid function and 
firm  ’s bid function,  ̂   and  ̂  , respectively. I use Pearson’s correlation test. 
Among all pairs, the null hypothesis of independence is rejected for all but one 
pair using a 5% two sided test.  
Next, I test for exchangeability and, as before, I follow Bajari and Ye 
(2003) to construct two kinds of tests: Exchangeability at the Market Level by 
pooling the fifteen firms in one group and Exchangeability on a Pairwise basis. 
The null hypothesis of the test is:              for all          and for all  
         
Let         be the number of observations,   the number of regressors 
and   the number of constraint implied by  . I consider the following statistic: 
 
   
             
          
 
 
which is asymptotically distributed as F with parameters        under the 
null hypothesis.  
At the market level, the restricted model imposes that the effect of the four 
explanatory variables is the same for potential cartel members and the 
remaining firms (i.e. this is the exchangeability hypothesis). The null 
hypothesis of exchangeability is rejected when comparing the group of 
potential cartel members against the remaining bidders. Next, I conduct 
pairwise tests by pooling firms accordingly and find that the hypothesis of 
exchangeability is rejected at conventional levels for 13 out of 15 pairs 
including the pair (D,P) as well as (A,D) and (D,E).  
Based on the previous analysis all pairs of firms considered do not pass at 
least one of the tests for competitive bidding. However, as mentioned above, 
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taking into account the number of simultaneous bids, firms D and P bid 
simultaneously more than a handful of times. Also, the triplet (A,D,E) is 
chosen as a potential cartel candidate. Therefore for the subsequent analysis I 
concentrate on two groups of candidates, namely the pair (D,P) and the triplet 
(A,D,E) as type 1 bidders.  
 
V.1. Summary statistics for type 1 bidders 
 
Firms D and P bid, on average, in projects of smaller size than the 
remaining thirteen large firms (i.e. type 2 bidders in the model) and roughly of 
the same size as the small firms (type 0 bidders). At least one of the firms 
participates in 325 projects winning 113 out of 724 contracts with and average 
winning bid of $3.67 million. On average the engineers’ estimate in these 
projects is above the winning bid. The average number of bidders participating 
in the 325 contracts is 4.65. Generally speaking, the data reveal that this pair 
tends to participate more often in small size projects with less competition. 
The other main firms tend to bid on larger projects and participate in 312 
lettings. Type 0 bidders (i.e. the remaining smaller firms in the sample) 
participate in almost all auctions (666 out of 724). Table 4 below contains 
summary statistics per type when type 1 bidders are the pair (D,P).  
Firms in the triplet (A,D,E) tend to bid also in smaller size projects relative 
to type 2 bidders. At least one of the firms participates in 329 projects winning 
117 times. The average winning bid for this group is $3.70 million which is 
below the average of the engineers’ estimate. There are about five bidders 
participating in the projects where the triplet bids. Table 5 shows some 
summary statistics.  
 
VI.  Empirical results 
 
In this section I present the empirical evidence obtained from the structural 
analysis. As explained above, there are two (alternative) groups of firms that 
have been selected as type 1 bidders, namely the triplet (A,D,E) and the pair 
(D,P). As a consequence the set of firms labeled as type 2 bidders is different 
for each case. Recall that both type 1 and type 2 bidders are large firms 
winning often. On the other hand, type 0 bidders (i.e. the small, fringe firms) 
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include the same set of firms in each case (see Tables 4 and 5). Thus, there are 
two sets of results: one corresponding to the situation in which the firms 
(A,D,E) are type 1 bidders and the other to the case in which the firms (D,P) 
are type 1 bidders. I will refer to the former as the “triplet–case” and to the 
latter as the “pair–case”.22  
There are both continuous and discrete variables involved in the estimation 
procedure. The set of continuous variables is given by     the log of the bid for 
the  th bidder in project   and   , the log of the engineers’ estimate in project 
 .23 For the discrete variables I include    ,     and    , namely the number of 
bidders of type 0, 1 and 2 in each project.  
As discussed above, the main purpose is to determine which model best 
describes the bidding behavior of the different types of bidders considered in 
this analysis. Moreover, both the competitive model and the collusive model 
differ only in the underlying distribution of private costs for type 1 bidders. It 
is then natural to attempt to find differences across the models by looking at 
these two distributions. Inspection of the expressions for the costs for each 
type of bidder in each model (see equations (4) and (5)) reveals that one should 
expect to find the greatest differences when: both    and    are small and    is 
large. A number of combinations among   ,    and    satisfy these 
conditions. I first discuss the results obtained from changing the number of 
bidders for types 0 and 2, respectively. The idea is then to assess the effect on 
type 1 distributions across models. I present results for two values of the (log) 
engineers’ estimate, namely 6.1 and 6.5. The first corresponds to fairly small 
projects (around $1.3 million). The second value is roughly the log of the 
average value in the sample.  
Figures 2 and 3 below contain the estimated densities of private values for 
type 0 bidders in the triplet–case and the pair–case, respectively. The 
distribution of private costs for type 0 bidders exhibits some variation with 
respect to    for both the triplet–case and the pair–case. The variability 
observed could be reflecting the randomness in the data. However, at least 
three other explanations are possible. First, the exogeneity assumption could 
be inappropriate for these firms. Second, it could be that there are asymmetries 
                                                          
22 In all the figures presented below the dashed lines show 95% (bootstrapped) quantile of the 
estimated distributions and the dotted lines represent 5% (bootstrapped) quantiles. 
23 All logarithms are base 10. Since the only continuous variable included as an explanatory 
variable is the engineers’ estimate, p=1 (see the definitions of the estimators in section III). 
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across type 0 bidders, which are assumed away in the theoretical model. The 
case of endogenous entry would require one to explicitly include in the model 
a description of how firms decide whether or not to participate in an auction, 
which as discussed before is outside the scope of this paper. Finally, it could 
be that not all cartel members are captured in the group of type 1 bidders. It is 
most likely that the results found for type 0 bidders are a combination of the 
premises outlined above. Nevertheless, type 0 bidders are fringe firms which 
hardly ever win a contract.  
Type 2 bidders’ distributions do not show great variation for different 
values of   . In Figures 4 and 5 I present the results for the triplet–case and in 
Figure 6 for the pair–case. Unlike the case of type 0 bidders, these results are 
more in line with what one would expect if bidders are symmetric (within 
types) and the number of bidders is exogenous, as assumed in this paper. 
Moreover, even when there are type 0 bidders participating (see Figure 5 and 
second row of Figure 6), the distributions for type 2 bidders are remarkably 
similar.  
In order to control for (to the greatest extent possible) other sources of 
variation, I decide to analyze how the distributions for type 1 bidders change 
as    changes. This is mainly driven by the above considerations regarding 
how the distributions of type 0 and type 2 bidders behave when the number of 
bidders changes.  
For the triplet–case, Figure 7 shows the effect on the distributions of type 1 
bidders in the competitive model (Model A, see the first row) and in the 
collusive model (Model B, see the second row) when      or      and 
    . The results for the case      (not reported) are similar. The 
distribution of type 1 bidders shows less variation in the collusive setup. That 
is, under the exogeneity assumption and the assumption of symmetry within 
types, this piece of evidence suggests that firms (A,D,E) could be engaged in a 
collusive agreement.  
With respect to the pair–case (see Figures 8 and 9), the results are along the 
same lines as those for the triplet–case. The distributions of private costs in 
Model B exhibit less variation than in Model A, thus, providing additional 
evidence supporting the collusive setup. This is so for the cases in which 
     and also when     . Recall that firm D is a type 1 bidder in both the 
triplet–case and the pair–case. Moreover, this firm participates in 44% of the 
projects in the sample. Thus, the similarity in the results for the triplet–case 
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and the pair–case could be driven by the fact that firm D is a type 1 bidder in 
both cases.  
Overall, the evidence in the sample tends to favor the collusive model over 
the competitive model.  
It is worth noting that I do not use a formal test, such as the Kolmogorov–
Smirnov (KS) test, to distinguish between the two models. The main reason is 
that conducting this kind of test is not straightforward in this case. Recall that 
private costs     are unobserved and I recover pseudo private costs,  ̂  , 
nonparametrically. Therefore a formal test should take into account the 
nuisance parameters introduced by the fact that  ̂ is used instead of   to 
estimate the distribution of private costs. This is not a trivial issue.
24
 Moreover, 
the distribution of private costs obtained is conditional on the engineers’ 
estimate which is a continuous variable. This further complicates the formal 
comparison of the distributions of type 1 bidders across models. For the 
outlined reasons the KS test merits a separate paper.
25
  
 
VII.  Conclusions 
 
This paper proposes a methodology to detect cartels acting in procurement–
auctions. Two competing models within the asymmetric IPV paradigm are 
used to investigate the behavior of firms competing for construction projects. 
In the first model (Model A) firms are engaged in a competitive game. On the 
other hand, in the second model type 1 bidders behave cooperatively. The 
method is applied to field data on highway construction projects in California. 
Relying on the assumptions of an exogenous number of bidders and symmetry 
among firms of the same type (but not across types) I find evidence suggesting 
collusive behavior during the sample period analyzed. I acknowledge that 
some of my assumptions are strong. However even under this restricted 
framework I find evidence supporting the operation of cartels.  
Relatively few empirical papers analyze the presence of bid–rings in 
auction markets within the structural approach. This paper contributes to this 
                                                          
24 See Aryal and Gabrielli (2013) for the use of Rank–Based tests in detecting collusion. 
25 Since the methodology developed in this paper is not based on a formal test to select models, 
it is outside the scope of this paper to perform a counterfactual exercise to compute the damages 
of collusion. For an example about this kind of exercise the reader is referred to Aryal and 
Gabrielli (2012). 
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literature. The exogeneity assumption is restrictive. For instance it precludes 
endogenous entry. However, a model in which entry is endogenous leads to a 
number of challenges.  
It is therefore desirable to develop a model with endogenous entry 
decisions affecting bidding decisions of firms to better understand the 
possibility of operating cartels. From a more applied perspective, the 
econometric model that follows from the theoretical model becomes also more 
involved under endogenous entry. I leave these issues for future research.  
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Table 1.  
Revenue shares and participation of main firms  
 
Note: Only firms with revenue shares >1% are reported. 
 
 
 
 
 
Firm ID
Number of 
Bids
Number of 
wins
Exp. 
Number of 
wins
Average bid 
(Mill. $)
Revenue 
Share
Participation 
rate 
A 50 9 10.34 4.83 0.02 0.07
B 34 13 10.51 3.21 0.012 0.05
C 43 9 10.46 5.32 0.013 0.06
D 319 97 87.32 3.61 0.145 0.44
E 46 11 10.15 4.49 0.015 0.06
F 42 15 10.7 3.63 0.016 0.06
G 25 12 5.84 4.09 0.027 0.03
H 26 6 5.16 5.03 0.011 0.04
I 21 7 4.27 4.54 0.012 0.03
J 20 9 4.69 3.84 0.015 0.03
K 34 4 6.9 8.44 0.019 0.05
L 35 16 7.95 4.32 0.02 0.05
M 29 13 6.94 3.69 0.016 0.04
N 9 3 1.55 6.33 0.012 0.01
O 31 5 6.82 6.37 0.011 0.04
P 50 16 12.95 4.03 0.027 0.07
Q 33 9 6.31 3.35 0.017 0.05
R 28 10 8.1 3.48 0.012 0.04
S 47 12 8.82 4.37 0.021 0.06
T 25 13 5.99 3.75 0.021 0.03
U 68 16 15.22 4.77 0.026 0.09
V 26 7 4.78 5.75 0.025 0.04
W 41 11 7.18 2.92 0.019 0.06
X 41 7 10.27 4.5 0.021 0.06
Y 11 4 1.89 6.04 0.012 0.02
Total 1148 351 282 0.57
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
152                                                               ECONÓMICA 
 
Table 2. 
Summary statistics 
 
Note: All dollar figures are expressed in millions.   
 
Table 3.  
Simultaneous bids 
 
 
No. observations Mean SD 
No. Bidders 724 4.62 2.37
Winning bid 724 3.33 3.11
Money on the table 724 0.3 0.46
Engineers’ Estimate 724 3.77 3.49
All Bids 3347 3.79 3.51
Backlog 3347 4.3 9.76
Distance (miles) 3347 123.98 162.93
Capacity (across firms) 413 2.3 5.69
Utilization rate 3347 0.2 0.32
Firm Pair
Simultaneous 
Bids
Expected 
Wins
First Bidder 
Wins
Second Bidder  
Wins 
(A,D) 44 9.03 9 5
(A,E) 20 4.05 3 6
(B,D) 29 9.51 12 10
(C,D) 17 5.65 5 9
(D,E) 41 8.67 8 9
(D,F) 26 7.46 5 9
(D,H) 19 3.92 7 3
(D,I) 18 3.68 1 7
(D,O) 25 5.16 7 5
(D,P) 44 11.08 13 14
(D,R) 27 7.96 10 10
(D,V) 22 4.2 5 6
(D,W) 19 2.97 2 3
(M,X) 22 4.91 11 2
(W,X) 15 2.81 5 2
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Table 4.  
Summary statistics per type 
 
Note: All dollar figures are expressed in millions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Number of 
observations
Mean SD
Number of 
observations
Mean 
SD
Number of 
observations
Mean 
SD 
No. Bidders 666 4.81 325 4.65 312 5.17
2.36 2.46 2.77
Winning bid 488 3.07 113 3.67 123 4.01
2.93 3.08 3.65
Money on the table 488 0.28 113 0.29 123 0.36
0.46 0.34 0.53
Engineers’ Estimate 666 3.64 325 3.74 312 4.32
3.38 3.27 3.72
All Bids 2520 3.69 369 3.66 458 4.41
3.49 3.18 3.81
Backlog 2520 1.37 369 24.6 458 4.05
3.4 16.44 6
Distance (miles) 2520 116.98 369 194.29 458 105.85
168.91 98.51 157.12
Capacity (across firms) 398 1.67 2 39.12 13 15.73
4.09 32.07 6.09
Utilization rate 2520 0.16 369 0.42 458 0.25
0.32 0.26 0.32
Type 0 Type 1=(D,P) Type 2 
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Table 5.  
Summary statistics per type 
 
Note: All dollar figures are expressed in millions.  
 
Figure 1. 
Bidder concentration 
 
Number of 
observations
Mean 
SD
Number of 
observations
Mean 
SD
Number of 
observations
Mean SD 
No. Bidders 666 4.81 329 4.66 306 5.08
2.36 2.45 2.76
Winning bid 488 3.07 117 3.7 119 3.99
2.93 3.12 3.63
Money on the table 488 0.28 117 0.3 119 0.36
0.46 0.34 0.54
Engineers’ Estimate 666 3.64 329 3.76 306 4.35
3.38 3.34 3.77
All Bids 2520 3.69 415 3.85 412 4.3
3.49 3.34 3.75
Backlog 2520 1.37 415 22.75 412 3.62
3.4 16.64 5.39
Distance (miles) 2520 116.98 415 146.87 412 143.74
168.91 100.69 172.66
Capacity (across firms) 398 1.67 3 31.72 12 15.63
4.09 26.84 5.72
Utilization rate 2520 0.16 415 0.42 412 0.23
0.32 0.28 0.3
Type 0 Type 1=(A,D,E) Type 2 
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Figure 2. 
Type 0 densities for various values of    - triplet–case 
 
 
 
Figure 3. 
Type 0 densities for various values of    - pair–case 
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Figure 4. 
Type 2 densities for various values of    and      - triplet–case 
 
 
 
Figure 5. 
Type 2 densities for various values of    and      - triplet–case 
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Figure 6. 
Type 2 densities for various values of    - pair–case 
 
 
 
Figure 7. 
Effect on type 1 distributions of changing    – triplet-case
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Figure 8. 
Effect on type 1 distributions of changing    when      – pair-case 
 
 
 
Figure 9. 
Effect on type 1 distributions of changing    when      – pair-case 
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Appendix 
 
Choices of Kernels and bandwidths 
 
As it is well known in the nonparametric econometric literature, the choice 
of kernel is not crucial in practice. The estimators in this paper are multivariate 
kernels which are computed as the product of univariate kernels. That is: 
 
  (
    
  
 
    
  
 
    
   
)    (
    
  
)  (
    
  
)  (
    
   
) 
 
where       refers to the multivariate kernel,        and       denote the 
univariate kernels corresponding to the continuous variables A and B, say, and 
      is the kernel for the discrete variables. Recall that                 . 
The econometric procedure follows closely that of Guerre, Perrigne, and 
Vuong (2000). Accordingly, the kernels for continuous variables are required 
to be symmetric with bounded supports (see Assumption A3 in Guerre, 
Perrigne, and Vuong, 2000). Thus, I decide to use the triweight kernel function 
defined as                            for these variables, namely  , 
  and  . The compact support of this function implies that only non-trimmed 
private costs are used in the second step to obtain the corresponding latent 
densities. 
For the kernels involving discrete variables I use a Gaussian kernel. The 
main reason to change the kernel functions for the discrete variables has to do 
with the nature of these variables. That is, given that relatively small variation 
in the number of bidders it is desirable to give more weight to observations 
farther from the point at which estimation takes place. This is best achieved 
with a kernel with unbounded support.26 
The smoothness of the distribution of private values is denoted by R, I 
assume R=1. The bandwidths' choice is critical in nonparametric estimation. 
To ensure the uniform consistency at the optimal convergence rates of the 
estimators the bandwidths for the continuous variables are of the following 
form:  
                                                          
26 There are no theoretical restrictions to the kernels applied to discrete variables. 
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               ̂     
         ,                ̂     
         , 
               ̂      
         ,               ̂      
         . 
The constant term comes from the so-called rule of thumb and the factor 2.978 
is the one corresponding to the use of triweight kernels instead of Gaussian 
kernels (see Härdle, 1991) and    denotes the number of observations kept 
after trimming. 
There are 56 bandwidths involved in the whole estimation procedure, with 
36 being used in the first step and 20 in the second step. Some bandwidths 
correspond to the continuous variables, while others to the discrete variables. 
The following tables summarize the values of the different bandwidths 
outlined above. 
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Table A.1. 
Bandwidths for the triplet-case 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.276 0.624 0.481
0.272 0.417 0.321
0.209 0.624 0.481
0.372 0.826 0.676
0.382 0.735 0.601
0.313 0.826 0.676
0.377 0.836 0.601
0.389 0.586 0.676
0.320 0.836 0.689
0.400 0.894 0.732
0.394 0.734 0.600
0.323 0.894 0.732
0.246 0.628
0.224 0.426
0.334 0.628
0.326 0.852
0.334 0.979
0.316 0.852
0.360 0.854
0.339 0.726
0.854
0.932
0.730
0.932
First Step
Continuous Variables Discrete Variables
Second Step
Continuous Variables Discrete Varialbles
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Table A.2. 
Bandwidths pair case 
 
0.276 0.624 0.481
0.272 0.417 0.321
0.209 0.624 0.481
0.369 0.963 0.791
0.379 0.441 0.362
0.311 0.963 0.791
0.377 0.994 0.820
0.387 0.362 0.298
0.320 0.994 0.820
0.396 1.049 0.856
0.392 0.539 0.439
0.319 1.049 0.856
0.246 0.628
0.225 0.426
0.332 0.628
0.324 0.973
0.342 0.597
0.316 0.973
0.353 0.978
0.336 0.449
0.978
1.086
0.548
1.086
First Step
Continuous Variables Discrete Variables
Second Step
Continuous Variables Discrete Variables
